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This article begins by introducing the different interpretations and movements associated with professionalism, as well as 
their relationship with medical ethics and bioethics. It then formulates and presents a proposal linked to virtue-based profession-
alism in which, on the one hand, these three fields are reconciled and, on the other hand, medicine is able to preserve its identi-
tarian goals, adapt to social and technological changes, and contribute to social progress. More concretely, it argues for the need 
to recover the heart of medicine, that is, to reincorporate its subjective dimension and learn to properly apply it to professional 
knowledge and practice. To achieve this objective, a three-stage training plan that inverts David T. Stern’s pyramid is presented. 
In the first stage, doctors (current or future) learn to exercise the virtue of sensory contemplation– the first habit of the heart – at 
the patient’s bedside. 
Professionalism guides this eminently practical training step. The second stage explores the reasons behind professional 
ethics from the internal logic of medicine, a task for which the study of the history of medical thought is crucial. Here medical 
ethics plays a special role. Professional training culminates in the acquisition of the intellectual virtues that enable intellectual 
contemplation– the second habit of the heart. With it, doctors are able to decide what is truly best for each patient, assume re-
sponsibilities as a citizen and last, but not least, take on the practice of medicine with passion. 
Bioethics introduces professionals to this third training stage, which typically occurs in the university setting.
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Professional motivation, Medical training
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“All theory is gray, my friend. But forever green is the 
tree of life”. 
[Faust. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe]
Two frameworks for professionalism
In 2018, the General Council of Medical Colleges (CG-
COM for its initials in Spanish) of Spain, which coordinates 
and represents all the Official Medical Colleges at the state 
level, defined professionalism as the “set of ethical and deon-
tological principles, values  and behaviors that underpin the 
commitment of medical professionals to service to citizens, 
that evolve with social changes, and that guarantee the trust 
that the population has in doctors” (CGCOM, 2018, p. 17). 
In this formula, the study and dissemination of professional-
ism is based on two pillars: first, the defense of a series of 
ideals on professional excellence and, second, an express ac-
ceptance of the possibility of changing said ideals based on 
society’s perception of medicine at all times, in all places and 
among all circumstances. The first pillar easily fits among 
the interests and tasks pertinent to medical education and 
bioethics and, before they existed, to ancient medical ethics, 
which included both. As Hamui and Ruiz point out, most 
definitions of professionalism “recall the fundamental prin-
ciples of medical ethics, from Hippocrates, to discuss current 
situations that are unacceptable” (Hamui-Sutton, Ruiz-Pé-
rez, 2017).
The second pillar, however, responds to a very particular 
interpretation of said ideals that veils a constructivist ap-
proach since the development and application of ethical prin-
ciples as well as the principles themselves are subject to the 
evolution of time. These ideals are understood as historical 
rational constructions, that is to say, normative tools whose 
function is to enable moral behavior. Thus, professionalism 
(and the bioethical currents that support it) attaches particu-
lar weight to observation and analysis of the social moment 
and especially to the particular circumstances of each moral 
scenario in order to ultimately obtain consensus. This is to 
the detriment of a rational dialectic founded on immovable 
principles that welcome the growth of being as a natural real-
ity, teleological entity, etc. In practical terms, one of the most 
significant signs of contemporary professionalism is found 
in the deep belief  that, insofar as doctors’ activity anchors 
them to the particular reality in which said conflicts take 
place, they can resolve conflicts, as well as identify the high-
est professional ideals. Indeed, on this view, doctors, together 
with other professionals, learn to avoid evil and to pursue the 
good at patients’ bedsides rather than in medical school or 
by reading books.
Here we find the conundrum that this article aims to ad-
dress. Is bioethics as an interdisciplinary field incapable of 
fulfilling its ends because of the emergence of professional-
ism movements? Does professionalism represent the covert 
rehabilitation of the ancient medical ethics that preceded 
bioethics? Today, new and old social imagery compete for 
primacy and, without a doubt, resolving this conflict will first 
bring significant change to professionals’ sensibility and then 
impact patients as well. The matter therefore merits serious 
consideration.
To answer this double question, we must go back in time 
to better understand the origin of the professional move-
ment. Three decades separate the CGCOM definition from 
the first conceptions of professionalism. At the end of the 
twentieth century, the American Board of Internal Medicine 
(ABIM) spread the term professionalism; until then, it was 
unusual to speak of “the force that drives doctors to do 
right by their patients no matter what” in bioethics forums 
L’articolo analizza, in primo luogo, la professionalità medica contemporanea, nei suoi diversi movimenti e interpretazioni, non-
ché il suo rapporto con l’etica medica e la bioetica. In secondo luogo, viene formulata una proposta, collegata alla professionalità 
fondata sulle virtù, che, da un lato, armonizza i tre ambiti sopra citati e, dall’altro, rende la professione medica in grado di preservare 
i suoi scopi originari, adattandosi ai cambiamenti sociali e tecnologici e di collaborare al progresso sociale. Più specificamente, in 
questa proposta si sostiene la necessità di restituire il cuore alla medicina, cioè di riabilitare la dimensione soggettiva e di imparare a 
integrarla correttamente nella conoscenza e nell’agire professionale. Per raggiungere questo obiettivo, viene postulato un particolare 
progetto formativo a tre fasi in cui viene invertita la piramide professionale di David T. Stern. Nella prima, il medico impara a eser-
citare, al capezzale del paziente, la virtù della contemplazione sensoriale – il primo abito del cuore. 
La professionalità guiderà questa fase di formazione eminentemente pratica. Nella seconda fase, verrebbero esplorate le ragioni 
dell’etica professionale entro la logica interna della medicina, un compito per il quale lo studio della storia del pensiero medico è 
fondamentale. Qui l’etica medica gioca un ruolo speciale. La formazione professionale culmina nell’acquisizione di quelle virtù in-
tellettuali che consentono la contemplazione intellettuale – il secondo abito del cuore. Grazie a esso, il medico è in grado di decidere 
cosa è veramente meglio per ogni paziente, di assumersi le sue responsabilità come cittadino e, aspetto non meno importante, di fare 
della medicina una passione. 
In questa terza fase formativa che è tipicamente universitaria, la bioetica riveste un ruolo prioritario.
Parole chiave: Professionalità, Etica medica, Bioetica, Contemplazione sensoriale, Contemplazione intellettuale, Motivazione 
professionale, Formazione medica
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(ABIM, 1992). The ABIM outlined several pillars of profes-
sional ethics not as objective content, that is, pillars on which 
to do science, but as ideas that are depositories of the power-
ful force capable of moving doctors towards the most im-
portant values in their profession, like trust, respect, honesty, 
etc. In short, this initial version of professionalism seemed 
to be interested in addressing the subjective, experiential di-
mension of ideals that operate in doctors’ mind, as well as in 
their hearts. From this new approach, analyzing values  gives 
way to the integral transmission of these ideals, that is, it in-
cludes what makes them operationally desirable. Thus, the 
main question regarding professionalism is here formulated 
in terms of moral psychology. What is needed for doctors to 
internalize, understand, and know the essential values associ-
ated with their professional activity?
Facing the winds of change
Multiple factors led to the appearance of this first pro-
fessional movement. The most important ones relate to 
technological advances, cultural changes and economic in-
terests that, starting in the mid twentieth century, have, at 
best, blurred traditional medical practice and, at worst, un-
dermined its deepest values. Catalysts for this transformation 
include the profession’s hyper-specialization and the atomi-
zation of medical schools, a boom in scientific publications 
and new difficulties surrounding the avoidance of informa-
tion overload, new legislation for patient rights and defensive 
medicine, qualitatively improved techniques for life support 
and organ transplantation, the social processes of medicali-
zation, and the improvement of cosmetic medicine (Echarte, 
2016). Today elements that seem to threaten the most tradi-
tional medical practices also include big data and artificial 
intelligence in clinical practice. They prompt questions like 
whether machines will be able to replace radiologists or sur-
geons or if  being human presents any added value. It is un-
derstandable that, even today, health professionals sense that 
their ways of working are threatened, especially when new 
scenarios force upon them tasks that have little or nothing to 
do with their initial vocational choice.
Faced with these circumstances, medical professionalism 
emerged to safeguard what is essential to medical activity. As 
was the case in the Hippocratic school, it implies the abil-
ity to incorporate technological changes, i.e., new and better 
ways of healing and caring, without giving up the profes-
sion’s ends. In effect, the Hippocratic-Aristotelian concep-
tion of health and medicine has been present in university 
faculties practically since their origin and is still manifested 
today, even if  only in an ornamental way, in the oath that 
medical students take when they finish their studies. It is no 
coincidence that the term force appears in the ABIM’s brief  
definition of professionalism, a term that is key to Aristotle’s 
theory of virtue, which is the basis of his entire ethics. I will 
address this matter in detail later, but, before that, two other 
factors that have driven the professional movement must be 
discussed.
The emergence and development of bioethics, especially 
since the 1980s, is a second explanatory factor that is also 
closely connected with the previous one. The development 
and transformation of medicine brought with it innumerable 
new problems that seemed to demand a robust interdisci-
plinary approach, and thus gave rise to bioethics. Therein, 
philosophers, jurists, economists, and sociologists, among 
others, came to the aid of medical ethics, which prior to 
that moment primarily received contributions from doctors 
(Rhodes, 2002; Washburn, 2008). However, some of these in-
vitees did more than seek new solutions to new problems and 
instead began to rethink and question the theoretical founda-
tions of the profession. This is the case, for example, of the 
classic concept of nature, a central point in the semantic con-
nection between the concept of health and the good, which 
was, until then, discussed outside the medical field rather 
than within it.
The most noteworthy example of this conceptual revo-
lution in medical ethics is found in Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics; first published in 1979, it was authored by the phi-
losopher Tom L. Beauchamp and the philosopher and theo-
logian James F. Childress. Considered a classic text among 
health professionals – and, for many of them, the main con-
sultation manual on professional ethics – its eighth edition 
was released in 2019. In general terms, in this work, the Hip-
pocratic-Aristotelian approach to ethics is displaced by prin-
ciplism, a modern and very particular version of Kantianism. 
Principlism proposes four principles as the basis for solving 
the new (as well as old) problems of medical ethics, includ-
ing non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy and justice. The 
success of this publication – and of principlism itself  – lies in 
its apparent simplicity. In the first place, it is based on what 
most human beings recognize as good. In addition, it pro-
poses dialogue as a method, an element that is to the lik-
ing of Western citizens with democratic sensibilities. Thus, 
it dispenses with everything else, especially subtle theories 
that require patient training. In the second place and disen-
chanted with metaphysics, it implicitly assumes many of the 
materialistic postulates of the time, including the reduction 
of nature to inert clay. Its attempt to reconcile freedom and 
nature gave way to the search for how to reconcile freedom 
between individuals. Again, for those who do not think much 
(or for those who can only think about one thing), molding 
this clay towards individual and collective interests is seen as 
a less complex and laborious task than trying to decipher the 
place and end of every single thing in the universe.
The liberation of medicine from obsolete beliefs, tradi-
tions and codes resulted in a further weakening of its aims 
and boundaries. Paraphrasing Zygmunt Bauman, the tri-
umph of principlist bioethics (today one could almost say, 
sans adjectives, bioethics), has made medicine, already in-
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fluenced by its context, even more liquid. On the one hand, 
its principles of obligation are not absolute (Degrazia, 1992) 
and, on the other hand, the principle of autonomy (respect 
for autonomy, as formulated in the latest editions of the Prin-
ciples of Biomedical Ethics) ends up prevailing in the resolu-
tion of ethical dilemmas (Solís García del Pozo, 2018). This 
covert autonomism, in which the doctor-patient relationship 
is practically reduced to a negotiation of wills, has led not 
a few professionals to seek refuge in movements that try to 
restore objectivity to bioethics and honor professional opin-
ion. Some have proposed new interpretive pathways for bio-
ethics, while others advocate for a return to medical ethics. 
In addition, for almost a decade now, more and more have 
begun to see professionalism as their lifeline.
After almost half  a century, bioethics may seem too im-
pregnated with autonomism for it to change course, while 
medical ethics has justly or unjustly earned a reputation for 
being retrograde, which has weighed it down so much that 
taking up its flag again seems impossible. Professionalism 
thus seems like the only viable third way.
Competencies in the humanities
The third factor that helps explain the emergence and 
evolution of the professional movement is found in the 
rise of new pedagogical approaches that, at the end of the 
twentieth century, aimed to improve the connection between 
educational centers and social labor demands. This phenom-
enon began in the United States in prestigious universities, 
but soon spread to Europe with the so-called Bologna Pro-
cess (Brunner, 2009), which focused curriculum development 
toward competence acquisition. The resulting study plans 
focus on identification and transmission of content as well 
as of professional skills and attitudes. In the case of medical 
school, a competency-based education presents some chal-
lenges, as Hayley Croft et al. point out, including knowing 
how to anchor training generalizations in specific, concrete 
and measurable behaviors (Hayley Croft et al., 2019). Pre-
viously, universities almost exclusively regulated medical 
education and teaching scientific-technical skills –in the 
classroom, in the laboratory, or in hospital internships– such 
that educational changes were mainly formal. The same can-
not be said for the transmission of humanistic values  since, 
traditionally, professional ethics was taught as a theoretical 
subject at the master’s level. Of course, students were sup-
posed to learn the ideals of medicine during their internships 
by observing and imitating their medical tutor, but this type 
of ethical-educational interaction was not usually explicitly 
integrated into teaching planning, nor was it systematically 
evaluated during practices. In the face of the challenges as-
sociated with competency-based education, the professional 
movement came to the rescue, which, as mentioned, had un-
dergone discourse development for two decades.
Until then, the initial professional movement was con-
cerned with identifying and defending the traits that charac-
terize and move a good doctor; it thus naturally paired with 
educational tasks related to medical humanism. However, 
two circumstances conditioned this approach. In the first 
place, with the aforementioned rejection of old philosophical 
reasoning, new constructionism, as well as approaches that 
came from outside the guild, did not result in solid alterna-
tive foundations, and were rather superficial and sometimes 
puerile. As a consequence, misuse of rhetoric, fallacies (es-
pecially the argumentum ad verecundiam or authority), the 
establishment and support of lobbies, and excessive use of 
pedagogical materials to appeal to students’ feelings (films, 
testimonies, etc.) became hard to resist temptations for many 
of the once well-intentioned advocates of classical profes-
sionalism. Second, new competency demands to objectify 
and measure learning outcomes forced professionalism to 
make behavioral commitments that were not present in its 
earlier formulations. In the absence of a solid conceptual 
and methodological apparatus regarding the ends of medi-
cine, the temptation to reduce education in medical ideals to 
the simple art of observation and imitation of behavior has 
come to represent a third, equally seductive temptation.
Faced with this panorama, criticism has never been lack-
ing since mere performance is always suspected of simulation 
and is, therefore, fragile, futile and sterile in ever-changing 
medical scenarios. Worse still, imitation, abandoned to its 
fate, usually leads to fanaticism and the stalest of sectari-
anisms. They are poisoned fruits, which not a few end up 
disavowing and surrendering to the opposite position (Kirk, 
2007; Hanna & Fins 2006; Jarvis-Selinger, Pratt & Regehr, 
2012). For many of these critics, including the author of this 
article, if  classical professionalism wants to be useful and 
survive, it must return to its origins and promote and work 
towards something that may not be entirely evaluable from 
an objective point of view, that is to say, to the source of 
all initial vocational movements and of all ultimate aspira-
tions towards the good. How can this be achieved? Before 
answering this question, it is necessary to consider other fac-
tors proper to the contemporary context in which medicine 
is immersed.
The autonomists’ response
The scenario became even more complex when, at the be-
ginning of the century, the prevailing bioethical movement, 
autonomist bioethics, began to take interest in the teaching 
approaches developed in professionalism. The simultaneous 
2002 publication of the article “Medical Professionalism in 
the New Millennium: a Physician Charter” in the Lancet and 
Annals of Internal Medicine journals represented the first 
milestone of this overlap. With it, a new sort of profession-
alism was born, immediately achieving heightened visibility 
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among health professionals. The aforementioned publication 
presented the Medical Professionalism Project and, although 
it had the participation of the ABIM, the weight of the ACP-
ASIM Foundation (American College of Physicians- Ameri-
can Society of Internal Medicine) and the European Federa-
tion of Internal Medicine was decisive for this principlist turn. 
In the introduction of this article, professionalism is defined 
as “the basis of medicine’s contract with society. It demands 
placing the interests of patients above those of the physi-
cian, setting and maintaining standards of competence and 
integrity, and providing expert advice to society on matters 
of health. The principles and responsibilities of medical pro-
fessionalism must be clearly understood by both the profes-
sion and society. Essential to this contract is public trust in 
physicians, which depends on the integrity of both individual 
physicians and the whole profession” (Project of the ABIM 
Foundation, et al., 2002). In these lines, we find the central 
guidelines associated with the definition of professionalism 
that a majority of medical colleges have assumed, including, 
among others, the CGCOM.
In short, the classical professionalist movement was 
spurred on by, on the one hand, a loss of the medical iden-
tity and, on the other hand, the promise that the principlist 
approach would return professionals to their proper respon-
sibilities. This promise weakened with the Medical Profes-
sionalism Project’s new version of professionalism, which 
is characterized by its inclusion of the social contract, of 
principles, and of public trust in physicians. In effect, these 
elements are obvious winks at a constructivist conception of 
medicine that, as mentioned, revolves around the establish-
ment of consensus, including on what the profession can be 
or become. Proof of this is found in the section following the 
introduction, which is dedicated to three of the four princi-
ples enunciated in initial principlism– the principle of non-
maleficence has long been imbued with that of beneficence. 
The question then emerges as to what is peculiar to profes-
sionalism with regard to bioethics. A brief  answer points us 
to know-how. If  bioethics examines the end of medicine, i.e., 
the good of the patient, professionalism takes care of pro-
viding doctors with the knowledge, and helps them acquire 
the requisite competencies, to achieve said end. The last sec-
tion of the article that outlines the Medical Professionalism 
Project addresses the responsibilities in which medical pro-
fessionals should receive training, including in professional 
competence, honesty and confidentiality, in avoiding inap-
propriate relationships with patients, in improving quality of 
care and access to care, in facilitating the fair distribution of 
resources, in promoting the advancement of scientific knowl-
edge, in maintaining trust through the proper management 
of conflicts of interest and in self-monitoring.
It must be noted that, as we will see below, these ten rec-
ommendations, which purport to be practical, continue to be 
entirely formal proposals since, with an autonomist founda-
tion, it is impossible to identify more concrete content with-
out getting into the specifics of every single medical case. 
How far does honesty or confidentiality go? And more im-
portantly, what does the fair distribution of resources or the 
proper promotion of scientific knowledge mean? For prin-
ciplism, professionals, in dialogue with individuals in each 
context, must give them (1) meaning and (2) abstract limits 
that should not be extrapolated to the whole medical com-
munity.
Varieties of professionalism
With the panorama described above, it is easy to under-
stand why a great diversity of currents has emerged from the 
initial version of professionalism. And this is even more so 
given the communication channels that now exist among all 
of them and that have multiplied, with intermediate posi-
tions, the definitions of professionalism. Despite this, it is 
possible to identify two broad groups in terms of content, 
including professionalisms that are presented as an alterna-
tive to bioethics and those that are constituted as part of it, 
i.e., a practical-teaching version. The fact that the former 
group also encompasses the competence dimension of ethics 
may seem confusing. On the other hand, using interpretative 
criteria, these two groups usually correspond to the anti-au-
tonomist and pro-autonomist groups, respectively, although 
not always or not entirely, especially in countries of West-
ern influence where medical sensibility still tends toward old 
school directives.
This is seen with particular clarity in Do-Kyong Kim’s 
Medical Professionalism in Neoliberalism. Kim, who teaches 
within the Department of Medical Humanities at Dong-A 
University in South Korea, relies on the definition from the 
Medical Professionalism Project and criticizes classical pro-
fessionalism for not responding to the winds of change, which 
are increasingly influenced by neoliberalism and commercial-
ism and which are transforming the demand for healthcare 
services. “Patients seek the help of doctors to attain healthier 
and more beautiful bodies as well as to treat diseases” (Kim, 
2019). He argues that if  doctors do not respond to new con-
sumption habits – that is, to new market needs, which also 
affect understandings of health and illness – then trust in 
health professionals will decline, which “will only elevate the 
skeptical attitude of doctors towards professionalism as a 
simple symbolic slogan. Professionalism should be feasible” 
(Kim, 2019). For Kim, professionalism– autonomist profes-
sionalism – will fail in its attempt to safeguard the medical 
identity and will bar the profession from evolving along with 
society if  it is inconsistent with its ideology.
Kim assumes the autonomist ideology of Western bio-
ethics and of this new version of professionalism. However, 
he urgently suggests that it avoid the overtones and scruples 
of a sensibility that is not yet completely liberated from out-
of-date worldviews. Even more significant is the fact that he 
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does not present a new professionalism, but gives voice to 
a type of professionalism called business professionalism, 
which was formulated a decade ago far from South Korea 
or any Eastern country by Brian Castellani and Frederic 
W. Hafferty, who work at the University of Kent and the 
University of Minnesota-Duluth, respectively. This profes-
sionalism characteristically prioritizes the autonomy of the 
patient, the free market, and professionals’ scientific and 
technical knowledge to the detriment of altruism and social 
justice (Castellani and Hafferty, 2006). Business profession-
alism does not fall into radical neoliberalism because it does 
not renounce benevolence and compassion in healthcare, but 
it does invert the classic scale of professional values  and sees 
benevolence as expendable.
Kim’s interpretation of the medical professional crisis 
brings a point of clarity to this discussion. The experiences 
of professional alienation that catalyzed the professional 
movement are more linked to doctors’ indecision about 
preserving old ideals or embracing new ones than to an on-
slaught of change. Preserving the medical identity implies, in 
one sense or another, a choice, which is precisely what West-
erners seem to be avoiding in their reluctance to give up the 
sensibility associated with the past. Whatever the solution to 
this dilemma, the problem of professionalism is now suffi-
ciently laid out.
This formulation of the Western identity crisis has been 
reinforced in recent years by scientific research on profes-
sionalism and interculturality. All of it points to the fact that 
the values  that define the medical profession change between 
cultures and generations much more than expected (Jha et 
al., 2015). One good example of this research came out of the 
University of California in collaboration with various Thai 
medical and university centers. The researchers analyzed 
the consensus on the definition of medical professionalism 
in four generations of emergency physicians. Their conclu-
sions claim that a certain consensus is recognizable among 
professionals, but not between different generations of pa-
tient groups (Hoonpongsimanont et al., 2018). As expected, 
with society’s evolution, confidence in medical profession-
als regarding their services, delivery thereof and what they 
should be varies significantly. In a second relevant article, Al-
Rumayyan et al. compare three frameworks of professional-
ism in non-Western countries and reach similar conclusions: 
“There is no single framework on professionalism that can 
be globally acknowledged” Al-Rumayyan et al., 2017). Both 
time and place introduce decisive factors for understanding 
what a profession is and the consequences of it revolving 
around social demand.
Are there as many versions of professionalism as there 
are cultures or ways of feeling? And more importantly, 
should doctors adapt to each of them? A positive answer is 
the most coherent position from the point of view of prin-
ciplist bioethics. The promise of a minimum ethic shared by 
all doctors and patients on this planet is usually met with the 
hegemony of the principle of autonomy, which, for the most 
consequential principlism, is the only true ideal with which 
one must learn to live. This applies to Kim and his belief  
that doctors should accept their profession as a mere social 
construction, thus preventing them from anchoring behavior 
in anything beyond social circumstances.
The pyramid of excellence
Despite clamors from the East, it will take years for West-
ern advocates of principlism to convince themselves that 
doctors in different societies need not have anything in com-
mon, at least in terms of the purposes of their activity. The 
pursuit of a minimum ethic across generations and cultures 
will continue to be an ideal in our universities and hospitals 
for some time, which explains the spread of a belief  that has 
been gaining strength over the past two decades among many 
doctors. It supposes that if, in the West, bioethics, like eth-
ics in general (with an autonomous character, of course), is 
concerned with the lowest common denominators that every 
doctor must meet instead of professional excellence as such, 
then who is in charge of monitoring such an ideal? It is worth 
recalling that the pursuit of excellence is what makes doctors 
feel most proud and fulfilled, and what often attracts them to 
the profession. Some have looked to professionalism for the 
answer to their concerns about the highest standards of pro-
fessional activity (Irvin, 2012). However, given the theoreti-
cal framework in which this professionalism of excellence has 
emerged, it is unlikely that a single model will be sufficiently 
accepted among professionals, thus imperiling its consolida-
tion. The opposite seems more likely, that is, that the num-
ber of professionalist proposals will increase so much and in 
such a diverse way that they end up stifling one another. The 
professionalism of excellence seems doomed to lead, like all 
ethics of minimums, to the entrepreneurial professionalism 
of Castellani and Hafferty.
The idea of  professionalism as a project dedicated to 
medical excellence has received support not only on a pro-
fessional level, but also on a competency level, that is, as a 
curricular strategy. One of the most influential works on 
the competence turn in American university curricula, as 
discussed above, came from David T. Stern’s framework for 
measuring professionalism. It places professionalism at the 
apex of the pyramid of skills that a medical student should 
acquire while studying her degree. The base contains clini-
cal competences, then communication skills, then ethical and 
legal understanding of clinical scenarios and, finally, sup-
ported by the four pillars of excellence, humanism, responsi-
bility and altruism, professionalism represents the integrated 
summit of them all (Stern, 2006). Numerous university hos-
pitals use this structure to transmit ethical content including, 
among others, the prestigious Mayo Clinic (USA), which has 
made Stern’s professional framework especially visible.
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Stern’s logic around professionalism and excellence is 
founded on the assumption that, only when students have a 
sufficient scientific-technical base and only if  they have ac-
quired sufficient communication skills to understand and 
make themselves understood with patients, can they consider 
the ethical dimension of the job. It is especially significant 
that the ethical and legal dimensions are placed in parallel, 
which reflects a certain comparison between two fields that, 
at least in their classical conception, although related, have 
a qualitatively different purpose and methodology. The law 
aspires to social coexistence and, at best, employs consensus-
achieving methods, while ethics pursues knowledge of the 
good, which requires the use of reason. 
In this light, ethics aspires to objectivity of the given, 
while law is always built starting from the most common 
practices that make up communities. This explains why the 
law may not be fair and the exercise of a good may be illegal. 
As Aristotle argued long ago, the more stable a society, the 
more it is possible to interchange ideas; dialogue begets wis-
dom, better social practices and, ultimately, better laws. The 
opposite is also true. The less rational people are, the more 
unstable their coexistence models are (Serrano, 2005). Of 
course, this thesis has incited extensive controversy. One of 
its best known detractors, Aldous Huxley, linked this thesis 
with scientific-technological development and suggested, in 
the Prologue of  his most famous novel, A Brave New World 
(Huxley, 2013), that a society can be very stable and, at the 
same time, perverse. Conversely, his latest novel, Island (Hux-
ley, 2006), exemplifies a beautiful, fair, good society that is 
nonetheless doomed to collapse based on perverse, external 
circumstances. If  Huxley is right, not all kinds of stability 
lead to dialogue and, ultimately, wisdom.
Leaving this controversy aside and returning to Stern’s 
scheme, the logic of locating the ethical and the legal on the 
same plane entails, to a large extent, an autonomist concep-
tion of ethics and, therefore, leads to assigning the same 
method to ethics and the establishment of laws. Herein, the 
difference between the two is found in that the law takes care 
of the lowest common denominator of a community’s goals 
to prevent the suffocation often associated with coexistence, 
while ethics protects and promotes other social behaviors 
more flexibly (Moreno, 1995). We thus arrive at the crux of 
this section – this upward dynamic permeates not only the 
bridge between politics and ethics, but also between ethics– 
ideals of mandatory compliance – and professionalism – ide-
als that demand free accession.
Autonomous professionalism of excellence faces, like 
bioethics itself, the stumbling block of implementation. In 
2009, Paul S. Mueller, a member of the Division of General 
Internal Medicine and Program in Professionalism and Bioeth-
ics at Mayo Clinic, asked the following about this challenge: 
“Excellence, humanism, accountability and altruism… how 
does one teach abstract concepts such as these?” (Mueller, 
2009). In his response, he advocates for the use of experiential 
audiovisual materials on professional and non-professional 
conduct and for interactive activities such as case discussion, 
role-playing and simulation, team learning, narrative writ-
ing, etc. In contrast, little space is given to the Stern frame-
work or even to theoretical reflection on the reason for these 
ideals. Theory is relegated to the background, which presents 
not a small problem because, however noble the values  of the 
medical community that receives new students, once gradu-
ated, new professionals venture into new settings with dif-
ferent, even opposing, sensibilities and their corresponding 
narratives and slogans. It follows that students would try to 
safeguard their identity as physicians by choosing similar 
moral niches for their professional activity, which leads to 
the inevitable intensification of the experience of profession-
al and moral feudalization. Nothing attracts relativism more 
than this situation. After having suffered from the decline of 
objective morality and the relaxation of practices for several 
generations, professionals have begun to experience burnout, 
which is now typical of the field and usually accompanied 
by the most cynical disregard for social conventions, whether 
minimum or maximum.
The return of virtue and nature
The serious problems associated with professionalism of 
excellence have not gone unnoticed by medical school profes-
sors. Many of them have lowered the professionalist ideal to 
what is affordable and measurable with relative rigor, specifi-
cally, good conduct and professional codes. Two profession-
alisms have emerged in this breeding ground. The first one, 
using David M. Irby and Stanley J. Hamstra’s nomenclature, 
is called behavior-based professionalism and mainly focuses 
on professional aspects that are manifest and independent 
of inner attitudes or group recognition. The second one is 
called professional identity formation, which is in tune with 
the consolidation and feudalization of the sensibility niches 
described above. In this group we could include, for exam-
ple, the definition of Medical Professionalism touted by 
the American Board of Medical Specialties, one of the larg-
est doctor-led organizations of its kind: “A belief  system in 
which group members (‘professionals’) declare (‘profess’) to 
each other and the public the shared competency standards 
and ethical values they promise to uphold in their work and 
what the public and individual patients can and should ex-
pect from medical professionals” (ABMS, 2018). The expres-
sion “belief  system” is not trivial and refers to the ideas one 
assumes that constitute the self – to a represented identity. 
Because the moral agent is consolidated in such system, mor-
al reflection outside of its limits is always very difficult, tire-
some, and involves overcoming the ever-present ideological 
character of the self  (Echarte et al., 2016). 
The Irby and Hamstra classification also includes a third 
type called virtue-based professionalism, which focuses “on 
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the inner habits of the heart, the development of moral char-
acter and reasoning, plus humanistic qualities of caring and 
compassion” (Irby and Hamstra, 2016). This third proposal 
rescues the notion of virtue and, with it, an ancient tradition 
about the good and human action. As mentioned, this tradi-
tion served as a theoretical framework in medicine for centu-
ries. Here, it resurfaces as a proposal to reunite three worlds 
– that of the objective and the subjective, the social and indi-
vidual, and action and contemplation. Professionalism based 
on virtue also offers a suggestive and integral vision of the 
relationship between ethics and professionalism. Finally, this 
professionalism may help many doctors – including those 
who defend the most traditional medical ethics – who have 
had to set aside the interpretative framework that gives their 
behavior meaning and have thus reduced ethics to procedural 
recommendations.
It is impossible to apply the Aristotelian theory of char-
acter without rooting it in its corresponding conception of 
nature, that is, if  one wants to avoid (1) the criticisms of its 
detractors, (2) adverse social sensibilities and climates and 
(3), most importantly, disenchantment from students and 
professionals who aspire to virtue with intellectual honesty. 
For Aristotle, natural beings contain a principle of move-
ment and rest “whether in respect of place, or growth and 
decay, or alteration. A bed, on the other hand, or a coat, 
or anything else of that sort, considered as satisfying such 
a description, and in so far as it is the outcome of art, has 
no innate tendency to change” (Aristotle, Physics II, 1, 192b, 
10-15; 1979, p. 23). Natural things, therefore, have an intrin-
sic purpose by which they are driven, which is, in addition, 
based on their position, state, time, etc. In contrast, artificial 
things have an external end that is given to them by their ar-
chitect. A third group of things has no purpose; for Aristo-
tle, they are (1) unconditionally necessary phenomena (they 
have no purpose, but cannot be otherwise), for example, the 
eclipses of the sun, and (2) fortuitous events (which have no 
purpose either, but cannot be otherwise), for example, for-
est fires. Non-teleological phenomena do not require an ex-
planation since answering the question of “why” leaves us 
with a) because it is so (necessary processes) or b) that is a 
nonsensical question (random processes). Thus, intelligence 
only deals with teleological and artificial phenomena, those 
to which it can give a meaningful answer.
The Aristotelian idea of  natural good, i.e., the end to-
ward which each natural object moves and its correspond-
ing place in the universe, takes on meaning here. By contrast, 
the good is absent from necessary, accidental or violent 
movements, while artificial goods depend on the architect’s 
interest(s) rather than on what is produced. However, the ori-
gin of artificial ends – the architect’s intelligence – is easily 
detectable, but natural ends are more difficult to apprehend. 
Aristotle proposes a method that has been crucial in the his-
tory of thought. “Spiders, ants, and the like have led people 
to wonder how they accomplish what they do, if  not by mind. 
Descend a little further, and you will find things coming to be 
which conduce to an end even in plants, for instance leaves 
for the protection of fruit. If, then, the swallow’s act in mak-
ing its nest is both due to nature and for something, and the 
spider’s in making its web, and the plant’s in producing leaves 
for its fruit, and roots not up but down for nourishment, 
plainly this sort of cause is present in things which are and 
come to be due to nature. And since nature is twofold, nature 
as matter and nature as form, and the latter is an end, and 
everything else is for the end, the cause as that for which must 
be the latter” (Ibid., 8, 199a, 20-30; 1979, pp. 40-41). Aristo-
tle thus arrives at the notion of final cause as an operative 
end from which growth is possible (the soul of things that en-
courages them for their good), which does not require, as pre-
sented here, the intelligence of what is preached or, at least, 
the kind of intelligence that contemporary biology holds as 
valid. Of course, the presence of intelligence, and of rational 
intelligence in human beings, is a sign of a final cause of a 
special nature. It is so special that it ultimately indicates that 
something in said natural object persists after death. In addi-
tion, Aristotle attributes divine origin to that something and 
affirms that human beings deserve particular respect among 
natural beings based on it.
Aristotle’s general framework is quasi-anthropocentric 
since, on the one hand, man is granted a special ethical status 
but, on the other, the good appears here as transcendental 
and is hidden in more things than we suppose, including in 
rational animals, in the sentient, in the members of the veg-
etable kingdom, as well as in many inert beings. The natu-
ral world is populated by beings with souls, beings in whose 
depths wonder is hidden because natural goods manifest the 
most exquisite of all beauty. As we will see it in the next sec-
tion, it is against this background where all pedagogy and 
acquisition of ethical competences would have to begin.
The great machine
Based on the theoretical framework presented in the 
previous section, any transformation that has the potential 
to distance medicine from its service to the natural good, 
whether intentional or not, individual or collective, is disas-
trous since the natural good is considered an objective reality 
internal to things rather than a construct. However, today 
those who consider themselves detractors of said autono-
mism, i.e., those who defend traditional medical ethics and 
virtue-based professionalism, assume both explicitly and 
implicitly important ideas forged in contemporary autono-
mism. In what follows, we briefly review some of them.
Since the dawn of modernity, the classical idea of  nature 
has been reduced, on the one hand, to that sort of human 
nature and, on the other, has been associated with the con-
ventional notion of intelligence. René Descartes is largely to 
blame for this double twist; in his metaphysical proposal, he 
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deteleologizes all reality except for human reality. The world 
is thus turned into an enormous machine fixed on ends that 
come from outside of it, from the Creator, the great watch-
maker. “With this,” Robert Spaemann writes, “teleology is 
drawn out of nature and placed with God’s spirit” (Spae-
mann, 1978). Second, Descartes associates the soul with the 
thinking part of man, the res cogitans. Thus, without con-
sciousness, ends cease to exist. Finally, Descartes proclaims 
substantive independence between the world of matter and 
the world of the spirit, which, in practical terms, also im-
plies certain methodological independence in his approach 
to both worlds.
The philosophical drift that Descartes initiated with the 
deteleologization of nature necessarily ends, according to 
Spaemann, in the deteleologization of  human beings (Spae-
mann, 1978). And indeed, new philosophies began to emerge 
from the Cartesian rupture. Kantianism, to which principlist 
autonomism is heir, is among the most important. Therein, 
the soul, as a given source of finality, is replaced by the ra-
tional will– i.e., the creative source of ends. Of course, this 
drift has also directly affected the way of doing experimental 
science. “Nature is what we have not done. But we can only 
do something because nature itself  constitutes a kind of ma-
terial that is already informed, and so we can understand it in 
analogy with what we do. And precisely because nature is not 
mere passive matter, Aristotle in turn distinguishes between 
natural and violent motion, a distinction whose disregard 
belongs to the fundamental premises of modern physics” 
(Spaemann, 1978). This Cartesian split and its attendant de-
teleologization have especially impacted the medical profes-
sion, dividing medicine into two kinds of disciplines, namely 
those ruled by physical causes, and those ruled by the mind. 
Within this paradigm, it is only possible to seek meaning 
and purpose in the latter psychological dimension. At the 
same time, this split has forged a new ethical sensibility in 
which the body, as an inert and indolent ship, must follow 
the course set by a pilot who would rather not listen his ship’s 
voice, much less dialogue with it.
The classical professional movement was in part fostered, 
as mentioned above, by many physicians’ desire to preserve 
traditional medical values without the baggage of traditional 
metaphysics. Now it is clear to see what this effort intended 
to leave behind. First, as Spaemann laments, traditional ide-
als were refounded on human possession of rationality and/
or his status as a creature of divine design. The idea of  the 
existence of a final cause, which is also present in other re-
alities and makes them worthy of respect, today engenders 
more scandal than praise. Laudato Si, Pope Francis’s 2015 
encyclical, has been a real wake-up call regarding this for-
getfulness. It is still too early to foresee the effects of this 
text among Catholic doctors who work in medical ethics and 
professionalism, but, optimistically, it might be an important 
step in eliminating the prejudice that sees, in general, return-
ing mystery to nature as weakening the dignity of human 
nature. On the contrary, competently opening human ethics 
to natural ethics would rehabilitate one of the most powerful 
arguments for the existence of good and evil. On the con-
trary, rejecting the teleological and aesthetic dimensions in 
the natural world implies accepting the presuppositions that 
empower autonomist arguments.
This is not merely a theoretical matter. Learning to con-
template reality in all of its richness, and to make a habit 
of said contemplation, is a fundamental way for doctors 
to develop sensitivity and ethical rationality. This issue is 
as important as it is absent in the vast majority of medical 
teaching plans, including medical ethics and classical profes-
sionalism. Further discussion of this matter goes beyond the 
confines of this contribution, however, it is worth mention-
ing a class I have been teaching since 2017 called Science and 
Literature at the University of Navarra’s School of Medicine. 
It first aims to teach students to see the world as great artists 
have captured it in their works. Its second, subordinate aim 
is to encourage them to apply this gaze to their profession on 
a regular basis, that is, to become artists in a world that itself  
is artistic.
Interdisciplinarity: between the particular physis and 
the universal physis
Another Cartesian idea that medical ethics has adopted 
pertains to methodological independence. Modern medicine 
has been closing in on itself  and on its methodological fields 
to the point that accusations of interference abound today 
even among the medical specialties themselves. In fact, the 
origin of bioethics is usually presented as an interdisciplinary 
response that, on the one hand, is necessary based on the 
changes derived from contemporary scientific-technological 
development and, on the other, as an alternative to a medi-
cal ethics too stuck on tradition and unable to integrate dis-
courses that are unaware of the profession’s internal logic.
There are several reasons to argue that, despite this, in-
terdisciplinarity has its limits and that, therefore, bioethics 
should be seen not as improvement, but rather as a natu-
ral extension of medical ethics. Some of these reasons are 
very old. The Hippocratic tradition, for example, presents 
the problem of the limits associated with the related fields 
of study. The Spanish anthropologist Pedro Laín Entralgo 
identified three well-defined positions in the Corpus Hippo-
craticum as follows: a) Philosophy as the express foundation 
of medicine; 2) discussion of prevailing philosophical knowl-
edge based on professional observations; and 3) “those who 
try to separate medicine as a field of knowledge from phi-
losophy” (Laín Entralgo, 1972). However, this third position 
must be adequately contextualized. It certainly renounces 
founding medicine on a speculative hypothesis (specifically, 
belief  in the existence of a Nous to which everything is di-
rectly subjected), which was characteristic of Apollonian-
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inspired medical schools and with which the Asclepius Hip-
pocratic School intended to break. Ultimately, the starting 
point of medicine should adhere to “experience, healthy re-
flection and ‘bodily sensation.’ These elements instruct us in 
‘the beginning and the way’ of the art of healing and in man’s 
true nature. This approach seems to argue for pure empiri-
cism and medicine’s complete independence from philoso-
phy” (Idem). However, Laín Entralgo adds, “a careful exami-
nation of the text reveals that its author intends to arrive at 
a philosophy (of man) based exclusively on medicine, rather 
than to practice medicine without philosophy” (Idem). It is 
not entirely accurate, therefore, to affirm that this new idea 
of medicine originated entirely in medical experience since a 
double speculative hypothesis supported the pillars of this 
third alternative, as we explore in what follows.
The first hypothesis recognizes the existence of a par-
ticular physis, a nature that justifies appealing to the proper 
reason that each thing possesses. Laín Entralgo enumerates 
some of them: “The stars, the parts of the world, the winds, 
the waters, food, medicines, man as such – the human phy-
sis–, the body, the soul, the different parts of the body, each 
human individual, the various characteristic ways of being 
man, diseases, animals”(Idem). Doctors are thus tasked with 
familiarizing themselves with the rational principle of the 
body, which is possible by way of each thing’s dynamis or vir-
tue, namely “the power or capacity of a thing to show what 
it is: whinny and green, for example, are dynameis proper to 
horses and grass”(Idem). In this context, doctors must de-
vote their lives to the human organism’s physis, which is re-
vealed in particular pieces of evidence that come into focus 
for those who know where to look, rather than by way of 
knowledge of the Nous, understood as the deepest soul that 
underlies each thing and in which everything shares.
This maxim can be sifted with the second speculative hy-
pothesis, namely a belief  in a universal physis that explains 
the harmony among all particular physes. Just as doctors 
must understand the proportions and relationships that ex-
ist among the body’s different organs, they must also keep 
in mind those that the body maintains with the rest of the 
natural realities. For Laín Entralgo, doctors in ancient 
Greece aimed at “love of universal nature, as realized in each 
man’s individual nature (in accordance with the root of the 
Platonic and Aristotelian theory of friendship)... As Plato 
says, ‘the patient is the friend of the physician because of 
disease, and for the sake of the health…’ It is no coincidence 
that the Greek mythical imagination attributed the invention 
of medicine to a god” (Lysis, 2017a). This aim begins in the 
body and ends in something that is outside of the body; the 
body is a herald and a reflection of it and it powerfully drives 
doctors’ lives. Thus, it is not an abandonment of the study 
of the body, but rather, thanks to knowledge of its relation-
ship with the whole as kósmos, physicians can discover the 
profound beauty that the body hides within it. The ultimate 
meaning of the medical vocation springs from an aesthetic 
relationship.
In applying the above framework to the initial discussion, 
bioethics appears as the catalyst of medical ethics and, con-
sequently, they do not maintain a symmetrical relationship 
since the former makes sense without the latter, but not vice 
versa – no matter how noble the latter’s ends may be. This is 
precisely one of the great evils attributed to contemporary 
bioethics, namely its uprooting accelerates the destruction 
of what is essential to the medical profession, a phenome-
non that goes hand in hand with forgetting the physis or the 
reason proper to the human body. This idealism, to which 
most interdisciplinary and principlist bioethics seems to have 
succumbed not only does not intensify the light in doctors’ 
hearts (because it degrades the study of the particular phy-
sis), but it also makes said light sterile by reorienting pro-
fessionals’ gaze from the human body to particular agents’ 
autonomy.
The alternative presented by the classical professionalist 
movement recovers the importance of the particular physis, 
but at the cost of undervaluing the universal physis. With 
this, post-Cartesian ethics and all of its ills are resurrected in 
an ethics closed in on itself  and at risk of losing even the ad-
vantages that it brings, in particular, an appealing rationality 
that integrates and governs the body as a whole. Harmony in 
the particular physis – sometimes called substance – is consol-
idated and nourished by a bigger physis of  which it is a reflec-
tion. Ignoring this subjective impulse means condemning the 
study of the body to a progressive and destructive process of 
homogenizing atomization. The cycle is closed here because, 
in this process, the particular physis also succumbs to blind 
and violent causes that cover it so thoroughly that it ends up 
accounting for the entire reality – i.e., the same information 
applies to both the human body and to the most distant star. 
These forces have little or nothing to do with the classical 
Nous or with the universal physis.
Far from being a prediction, the drift of medical ethics 
can be recognized as history because, let us recall, its worst 
fruits (closure, elitism and monopoly) gave rise to contempo-
rary bioethics in a rebound effect.
Health, happiness and universal good
In rehabilitating the axiomatic and hierarchical relation-
ship between the particular and universal physis, we find a 
way out of the sterile dispute that classical professionalism 
and autonomism have maintained for decades. In addition, 
it entails mutual recognition between medical ethics – in-
cluding new professionalism – as an entity associated with 
the study of the particular physis and bioethics – seen as a 
method with an interdisciplinary approach of a purely objec-
tive nature.
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“The professional ethos of physicians,” Sabine Sallock 
writes, “must be differentiated from the perspective of ethics 
which can take a universal standpoint and has the potential 
to critically assess context-specific moral norms.” (Sallock, 
2016). The challenge is found in figuring out how the two are 
related. The ethos of  medicine involves the particular human 
body, but the norms that constitute it are not conjunctural or 
circumstantial. The same goes for any scientific field insofar 
as it addresses the inner reason of the objects that constitute 
it and, at the same time, seeks interdisciplinary dialogue giv-
en that such reason reveals to scientists an intimate alterity 
with the other, and with the whole – the elan of  the universe.
The delicate relationship between both physes is espe-
cially important in fields expressly dedicated to the study and 
practice of the good. Medical ethics falls within that descrip-
tion since its end and good correspond to patient health and 
care. These particular human affairs, however, must be in-
tegrated with other goods for the attainment of happiness 
– the superior and ultimate good. Indeed, just as the good 
of the body transcends the body itself, the norms that gov-
ern the body reach beyond the body. Otherwise, any claim 
to objectivity would be futile, and the opposite is also true. 
That the medical ethos is capable of objective analysis does 
not lead to the conclusion that it can be classified as a science 
stricto sensu. As Aristotle pointed out long ago, no ethics, 
including medical ethics – indeed, no search for knowledge 
about the good, be it particular or not – can be classified 
as pure science or episteme. Medicine is an art (techné) be-
cause its ultimate goal is to care for the sick on the particular 
level, rather than to reach universal truths. Similarly, medical 
ethics is the study of the end/good associated with said art. 
Thus, it seeks a particular good based on two considerations, 
namely it does not refer to the good of the universe or to the 
general good of man.
Health, like pleasure, wealth, honor, etc., is subordinate 
to a greater good, namely human happiness, which is, in turn, 
subordinate to an ultimate good. Aristotle says, in likely ref-
erence to the ideas of his teacher Plato, that said ultimate 
good “is good in itself  and causes the goodness of all these 
as well” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book I, Chapter 
IV, 1095a, 25-30, p. 5). Knowledge of the two goods above 
health cannot be accessed through the art of medicine as 
such, but is reached, Aristotle further argues, with the acqui-
sition of prudence (practical wisdom), an intellectual virtue 
with which we are able to understand what is most fitting 
for each situation. As he notes, “Now it is thought to be a 
mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliber-
ate well about what is good and expedient for himself, no in 
some particular respect, e.g. about sorts of things conduce to 
health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce 
to the good life in general. This is shown by the fact that we 
credit men with practical wisdom in some particular respect 
when they have calculated well with a view to some good end 
which is one of those that are not the object of any art. It 
follows that in the general sense also the man who is capa-
ble of deliberating has practical wisdom” (Ibid., Book VI, 
chapter V, 140a-b, p. 142). Numerous goods compete in most 
daily human deliberations on what is best, not in one respect 
or another, but, in general, in what suits the individual and, 
even more generally, in terms of the good of the universe. 
In the Aristotelian framework, a reckless doctor is seen as 
one who forgets her patient’s general good and sticks to lim-
ited activity that, in the end and for this very reason, starts 
to become perverse. Again, medical ethics and bioethics ap-
pear here in their noblest, most symmetrical and mutually 
necessary relationship. In addition, Aristotelian theory on 
the knowledge of the good also provides us with new light 
regarding the stages and periods of learning, which can be 
helpful in physician training, as we explore below. 
Aristotelian prudence is an intellectual virtue and the key 
to moral thought, which, without being either, draws from 
both practical experience – art – and the most speculative of 
activities – science. “Therefore, since scientific knowledge in-
volve demonstration, but there is no demonstration of things 
whose first principle are variable (for all such thing might ac-
tually be otherwise), and since it is impossible to deliberate 
about things that are of necessity, practical wisdom cannot 
be scientific knowledge or art; not since because that which 
can be done is capable of being otherwise, not art because 
action and making are different kinds of thing” (Idem). Ex-
perience is required, of course, because human beings cannot 
apprehend the principles of morality without it (for example, 
that good must be done and evil refrained from) – a type of 
quasi-intuitive knowledge (the Aristotelian epagoge) whose 
acquisition the Scholastics assigned to synderesis, namely, 
the intellectual habit of practical principles. Experience is 
also necessary because every moral action is the result of a 
deliberation and the choice of a specific good called a de-
liberate desire or proairesis. There, intelligence and affectiv-
ity share its deepest roots and reference to the human heart 
gains meaning. Habits of the heart is used here as a technical 
term that should be understood as the exercise and perfec-
tion of the ties that unify objective and subjective approaches 
to knowledge.
We must avoid misinterpreting the claim that concrete ex-
perience is fundamental to prudence. It does not mean that 
prudence is confined to experiences. The agent, and the world 
as a whole, are assumed and expressed in each deliberate de-
sire, in each exercise of the heart. This inclusion is analogous 
to a spider web in that the behavior of one of its nodes de-
pends on and reflects the entire system, which is characteris-
tic of the response in systems that have network properties. 
Considering the background of actions in this way connects 
the need for experience with the need for science since this 
deliberate desire also takes into account that which is neces-
sary and objective regarding human persons and their world.
One of Aristotle’s best-known claims summarizes the 
role of active experience in ethical learning. “For the thing 
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we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing 
them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players 
by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, 
temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts” 
(Ibid., Book II, Chapter 1, 1103b, pp. 28-29). To some extent, 
this approach supports classical medical ethics’ protection-
ist theses. A doctor’s opinion on his patient’s good somehow 
takes priority over the opinions of those who analyze that 
good from a purely objective point of view. However, this is 
only true if  said opinion is based on virtues that transcend 
the strict search for health. It is here where Aristotle’s view 
gives weight to bioethics’ opening-up theses – they elevate 
medicine to a political task and, for Aristotle, politics is the 
science of the ultimate and best good. “The end of this sci-
ence must include those of the others, so that this end must 
be the good for man” (Ibid., Book I, Chapter 2, 1094b 1-5, 
p. 2). In this way, a good doctor seeks to practice politics in 
his art, and he does so insofar as he tries to restore health to 
patients, knowing that they also aspire to happiness. A good 
doctor is, therefore, a good citizen who dedicates part of her 
time to reflection, dialogue and exercise of political activity. 
More than in any other, prudence reigns as the fundamental 
virtue in this task. 
In translating this discourse to the present proposal, we 
can see that if  bioethics does not assist medical ethics in the 
work of reconciling health, happiness and the universal good 
and if  we reduce medical ethics to an ethic devised by doc-
tors alone (sometimes also called clinical ethics), then medi-
cal ethics not only does not help, but also actively hinders 
professional activity. This error is as disastrous as reducing 
medical ethics to a pure argumentative game, that is,to a bio-
ethics blind to medical experience. These are two sides of the 
same error-laden coin and produce similar results, namely 
a profession at the mercy of power struggles or of patients’ 
caprice.
The habits of the heart
This relationship between art, science and politics in-
verts Stern’s vocational training pyramid. In the first place, 
professionalism should be placed at the base of the pyramid 
to provide medical students and young doctors with all the 
experiences and first reflections that are necessary for under-
standing the subsequent step in medical ethics and, finally, in 
bioethics. The reason behind this is move follows Aristotle: 
“Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about 
what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of 
political science must have been brought up in good habits” 
(Ibid, Book I, Chapter IV, 1095b 5-10, p. 5). As he argues, 
no treatise on ethics, no matter how accurate and profound 
can move anyone towards the good. Real knowledge, that 
which reaches the operational level, must be accompanied 
by the subjective, experiential dimension in a process called 
understanding. Indeed, deliberation without desire is one of 
the great evils of contemporary bioethics, whose discourse is 
often inadequately connected with medical experience and, 
therefore, lacks persuasive power among professionals who 
are increasingly skeptical of bioethics in particular or, what 
is worse, of ethics in general.
Ethical reflection requires habits, i.e., certain behavio-
ral, intellectual and affective predispositions that arise from 
practice and learning. Increased sensitivity is one of the 
most important effects of habit. A doctor’s first visits to a 
patient and first considerations of what might be good for 
her are a great opportunity for apprehending ethical prin-
ciples and also many simple, but fundamental ideals, all of 
which strengthen the doctor’s maturity. However, any type of 
experience and reflection whatsoever is insufficient for such 
growth. Every sommelier knows that students must follow 
the appropriate steps to become wine tasting experts. Knowl-
edge and a taste for wine, which is always sour at first, require 
patience and good lessons. Today, there are even neuroscien-
tific studies that support this thesis (Plassmann et al., 2008). 
Ideas are capable of changing our affective relationship with 
the environment and, most importantly, our very perception 
of reality. This search for perfection can be called sensory 
contemplation, which is the first step in developing the habits 
of the heart; in it, the intellect participates like a radio dial.
Teacher play a leading role in this first stage of profession-
ally teaching medicine and serve as a reference for students to 
observe, imitate and listen to. In addition, artistic works are 
useful in this initial training step in that they teach doctors to 
look at reality through the eyes of an artist. The latter is usu-
ally better trained to identify marvels in the most mundane 
of moments or even, like in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s novels, in 
the horror of confinement, disease, and suffering.
In the next stage, as doctors grow in the first virtues, dis-
cursive activity becomes more relevant in that ideals arise, nu-
ances are no longer trivial, inferences become more complex, 
etc. In short, improving methods and dialogue becomes im-
perative for professional growth. At this intermediate point, 
tradition plays an important role as a reservoir of paths that 
have been walked down before. It is an essential basis for 
correctly interpreting contemporary medical thinking and 
feeling. Recalling this ancient reservoir guards against one 
of the evils that haunts both classical and autonomist profes-
sionalism, namely their break with a tradition rashly seen as 
solipsistic and outdated. This rupture did not come about 
based on examining the reasons that led old ways of think-
ing to their decline, for example, analyzing the Cartesian turn 
mentioned previously. This sort of mistake frequently leads 
to amendments to the whole and, with it, to the rejection of 
the good that tradition potentially contains.
Contemporary professionalism designs many of its pro-
jects with its back to more than two millennia of thought, 
thus running the risk of repeating the same mistakes. This 
degenerative process does not just affect medicine. As the 
95LUIS ECHARTE ALONSO Two habits of the heart: a bridge-building proposal for professionalism, medical ethics and bioethics
Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset correctly diag-
nosed in the 1920s, this phenomenon is due to a widespread 
belief  that the understanding of history – what he calls his-
torical reason – is wholly separate from the sustainability of 
achievements in the present. “Civilization is not ‘just there,’ 
it is not self-supporting. It is artificial and requires the artist 
or the artisan. If  you want to make use of the advantages of 
civilization, but are not prepared to concern yourself  with 
the upholding of civilization – you are done. In a trice you 
find yourself  left without civilization. Just a slip, and when 
you look around everything has vanished into air. The primi-
tive forest appears in its native state, just as if  curtains cover-
ing pure Nature had been drawn back. The jungle is always 
primitive and, vice versa, everything primitive is mere jungle” 
(Ortega y Gasset, 1951, p. 97). Buildings and social practic-
es (as monuments and ancient traditions) last longer than 
other, more important things in civilization, namely moral 
or prudential sensitivity, i.e., that which members of a com-
munity understand (see) as the meaning of their practices, 
the pursued good and the proper means for reaching it. If  
contemporary medical students have difficulty grasping what 
was evident to their predecessors, it is probably because their 
teachers, often with irreproachable conduct and attitudes, 
transmit fewer arguments, or weaker arguments, for explain-
ing their decisions and habits.
This new presentist professionalism also leads to decline 
in the imitation of behavior. In other words, circumscribing 
the field of medical knowledge to the here and now changes 
doctors of the future in significant and disastrous ways, espe-
cially with respect to the patient. One of the great conquests 
of the civilizing spirit was precisely the conquest of our cur-
rent sensitivity towards patients. If  history is forgotten – in-
visible as it is to our eyes – said virtue will end up confined in 
a museum display case like the mummies of Egypt, no matter 
how sensitive and well-intentioned today’s medical educators 
may be. Sensitivity can be, in this context, a double-edged 
sword because, as Aristotle writes, “[f]or the fact is a starting-
point, and if  this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not need 
the reason as well” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 
Chapter IV, 1095b 5-10, pp. 5-6). Indeed, seeing things is in 
itself  good – the best in the moral sphere. However, it is also 
disastrous if  it is accompanied by a wrong idea, in this case, 
the belief  that one can dismiss the shoulders of the giants 
upon which we figuratively stand.
Alasdair MacIntyre, another contemporary philosopher 
who has exhaustively studied the effects of historical blind-
ness on individual and social virtues, also writes about the 
natural mirage that affects modern education in moral sensi-
tivity. Specifically, in his most famous book, After Virtue, he 
denounces our forgetfulness of one of the great advances in 
the classical world, namely understanding human action as 
deliberate desire that, as noted earlier, demands we pay atten-
tion to the part and the whole. This forgetfulness has resulted 
in the involution of Western thought towards obsession with 
the study of parts. Post-Cartesian methodological bias is a 
primary example of the evil that is now spreading even out-
side of the sciences. “The social obstacles derive from the 
way in which modernity partitions each human life into a 
variety of segments, each with its own norms and modes of 
behavior. So work is divided from leisure, private life from 
public, the corporate from the personal. So both childhood 
and old age have been wrenched away from the rest of hu-
man life and made over into distinct realms. And all these 
separations have been achieved so that it is the distinctiveness 
of each and not the unity of the life of the individual who 
passes through these parts in terms of which we are taught to 
think and to feel” (MacIntyre, 1984, 204). Recovering think-
ing and feeling – i.e., the Western heart – requires looking to 
the past and, from there, to the whole of which we are part. 
The latter movement constitutes the leap that medical ethics 
must take towards bioethics to safeguard professionals from 
the bad winds of change and to help them take advantage of 
the good ones in order to reach new and better destinations.
Towards citizenship
A doctor’s training begins with observation of reality, 
continues with studying the past and concludes with dia-
logue among those who can help him imbue his actions with 
as much political meaning as possible, which, as mentioned, 
consists in knowing how to relate health, happiness and the 
universal good. The thin line that separates these three terms 
also serves, as Aviva Preminger et al. argue, to differentiate 
professionalism from ethics: “For example, a surgeon who 
posts patient images without consent is unethical. However, 
the surgeon who posts lewd patient images with consent is 
unprofessional. It is often unclear where ethics ends and 
professionalism begins and the two are therefore often con-
flated” (2018). If  we follow this argument, we could invert the 
terms that Preminger et al. use as follows: the former exam-
ple would pertain to professionalism and the latter to bioeth-
ics. What matters here is that the former example points to 
a question that is easily evaluated using the internal logic of 
medicine, while the latter is not directly related to health and, 
therefore, cannot be easily assessed in this single light. Diag-
nostic images are a medical means used here for the wholly 
unrelated end of pornographic consumption. The problem 
is not, in itself, changing the end, which can be legitimate 
and appropriate (for example, the use of medical knowledge 
to improve athletes’ performance), but rather is found in the 
suitability of the new ends and their use in the pursuit of 
happiness. 
What is the greatest good to which a human being can 
aspire and what actions can help him achieve it? The former 
is one of the great philosophical questions and corresponds 
to Pythagoras’ overall understanding of philosophy. Even 
more important, according to the Neoplatonist philosopher 
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Iamblichus, Pythagoras defined the philosopher as one who 
is dedicated to the study of the most beautiful things, an idea 
that Aristotle also shares. Wonder is hidden deep in things: 
“All begin, as we have said, by wondering that things should 
be as they are, e.g., with regard to marionettes, or the sol-
stices, or the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square; 
because it seems wonderful to everyone who has not yet per-
ceived the cause that a thing should not be measurable by 
the smallest unit. But we must end with the contrary and 
(according to the proverb) the better view, as men do even 
in these cases when they understand them” (Aristotle, Meta-
physics, Book I, , 980a-993a). Awe arises with increased un-
derstanding of the particular physis of  a natural object, but 
reaches its peak with understanding of the universal physis, 
which is the philosopher’s highest reward and, above all, the 
key to happiness for a rational being such as man. Indeed, 
happy is the man who knows where to go, who knows where 
everything is going.
In the political sense conferred here, bioethics requires 
a certain maturity. “A Young man is not a proper hearer of 
lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the 
actions that occur in life, but is discussions start from these 
and are about these” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 
I, Chapter III, 1095A 1-10, p. 3). While a young doctor is 
trained in the intellectual and moral virtues necessary for 
sensory contemplation in his daily practice, a mature doc-
tor acquires the virtue of intellectual contemplation in the 
agora. Said contemplation, in line with Platonism, is the last 
instance of the habits of the heart; herein, the intellect is ca-
pable of apprehending and enjoying ultimate causes and the 
highest ideals in a quasi-intuitive way. At this stage, the main 
catalyst pertains to a proper dialectic, i.e., good dialogue, 
rather than to experience (Llano, 2007).
At this point, it is important to mention interdisciplinary 
training from the perspective of access to the good as a sort 
of prudential training, rather than from the perspective of 
the more common approach of access to the truth. In the 
case of medicine, this last formative stage is equivalent to 
training in bioethics, thus assigning to bioethics much more 
extensive functions than those conferred to it to date. This is 
so because doctors’ true reward is found in the global kind 
of interdisciplinarity that compares the totality that each 
human action demands, rather than a local look. Thus, the 
most effective bioethics is supported by university faculties.
The obstacles in going from medical ethics to bioethics 
are not small. The first of them is linked to ignoring or un-
dervaluing artistic studies in academia. Interdisciplinarity as 
outlined here requires openness to the world, which is only 
feasible if  it brings together different types of knowledge, 
including experiences and feelings. Very seldom are artists 
invited to participate in interdisciplinary medical training 
programs.
A second obstacle involves widespread university-level 
disinterest (and growing inability) in maintaining worldviews 
or generating new ones, which is in large part due to, as men-
tioned, the triumph of atomizing post-Cartesian schemes in 
the highest intellectual spheres of society. Ortega y Gasset 
laments that the West has forgotten the goal that was once 
one of its great civilizing achievements. “Is the higher educa-
tion nothing more than professionalism and research? … The 
medieval university does not research. It is very little con-
cerned with professions. All is ‘general culture’ – theology, 
philosophy, ‘arts.’ But what is called ‘general culture’ today 
was something very different for the Middle Ages. It was 
not an ornament for the mind or a training of the character. 
It was, on the contrary, the system of ideas, concerning the 
world, and humanity, which the man of that time possessed. 
It was, consequently, the repertory of convictions which be-
came the effective guide of existence” (Ortega y Gasset, 1983, 
pp. 36-37). 
Medieval university was directed toward the formation 
of prudent men, that is, people who study happiness to find 
how to do the good in each concrete situation. They are 
what we would call intellectuals today, the vanguard of true 
civilizational progress – people who pursue and are lured by 
goods that consolidate and move a true community rather 
than being obsessed with the development of technology. 
“Life is chaos, a tangle and confused jungle in which man is 
lost. But his mind reacts against the sensation of bewilder-
ment: he labors to find ‘roads,’ ‘ways’ through the woods, in 
the form of clear, firm ideas concerning the universe, positive 
convictions about the nature of things. The ensemble, or sys-
tem, of these ideas is culture in the true sense of the term: it is 
precisely the opposite of external ornament. Culture is what 
save human life from being a mere disaster; it is what enables 
man to live a life which is something about meaningless trag-
edy or inward disgrace” (Idem). Of course, this Spanish phi-
losopher understands that the university’s political mission 
inevitably identifies with its most philosophical mission since 
the search for truth, which is always a search for beauty, also 
requires all researchers’ collaboration, and ends up connect-
ing all things. Paradoxically, the contemporary university, 
based on ignorance, scruples or mistrust, seems to defend the 
study of truth, but suppresses its responsibility toward the 
study of happiness.
Universities are reducing their political-scientific aims to 
mere technical training. Today, profession means training stu-
dents to meet each society’s particular demands at all times 
for reasons we have already explored. The situation is grave 
and has reached a point in which even students’ expectations 
have become a central evaluation criterion in rating the qual-
ity of teaching. This contradicts institutions’ true purpose, 
which corresponds to transforming and elevating students’ 
expectations and ideals. This trend holds true for medicine 
as well. The humanist doctor, who was once a regular in 
cultural and political forums, has been replaced by hyper-
specialists who, according to Ortega y Gasset, constitute a 
new type of barbarian or worse for having turned intellec-
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tual vulgarity into a duty. The hyper-specialist researcher, he 
writes, “is only acquainted with one science, and even of that 
one only knows the small corner in which he is an active in-
vestigator. He even proclaims it as a virtue that he takes no 
cognizance of what lies outside the narrow territory specially 
cultivated by himself, and gives the name of ‘dilettantism’ to 
any curiosity for the general scheme of knowledge” (Ortega 
y Gasset, 1951, p. 122). 
Ironically, more and more hyper-specialists seem to sup-
port supposedly interdisciplinary initiatives. Some of them 
do so because they want to open up lines of research that 
have to date only produced failed hypotheses – a legitimate 
intention, but one that fails to recognize the important goals 
of interdisciplinary dialogue. Others try to preserve some-
thing of the university tradition based only on a nostalgic 
and capricious attachment to its ancient instantiation. Oth-
ers cling to the feeling of power associated with the label of 
“intellectual.” In close step, some just want to make money 
in other fields when the notoriety expected in their field of 
origin fails to deliver. Finally, others wish to produce intellec-
tuals for purposes beyond profit, although without renounc-
ing the concept of hyper-specialism. Obviously, all of these 
attempts will fail because knowing a lot about something is 
not enough for understanding the other, much less the entire 
world – no matter whether the hyper-specialists is an expert 
in science, art or a modern version of philosophy.
Returning to the origins of philosophy based in the So-
cratic tradition, the main ingredient in interdisciplinary for-
mation is awe for the object of study, which is authentic when 
it spreads to those who collaborate in its pursuit. Only dia-
logue with awe, which is also dialogue with charity, enables 
intellectual contemplation. Conversely, persisting in dialogue 
is only possible starting from intellectual contemplation 
(Echarte, 2016), but – a word to the wise – this loving attitude 
can also be imposed on the other and even on oneself, which 
constitutes the worst kind of self-deception. Some interdisci-
plinary schools and projects justify its members’ greed in the 
name of the love of science, society or even in the name of 
God. Religious believers must be especially vigilant against 
this third case because, when a working environment falls 
into this kind of error (a sort of institutional sin against its 
Spirit), it is very difficult to avoid the production of labyrin-
thine persuasive and self-indulgent pseudo-knowledge. And 
it eventually leads to a massive loss of sensitivity towards the 
truth, the good, and the person. However, successful it may 
be in the world’s eyes, it is best to abandon a given research 
or training project that falls into this abomination of desola-
tion, using a biblical expression, because even its best mem-
bers could not avoid being infected with this voluntary but 
progressively unconscious deafness. Words there are useless. 
The only way to prevent the spread of this scandalous vice 
is bearing witness by abandoning the project. Faith, compas-
sion and a great sense of humour are the most effective weap-
ons in this last flight.
Conclusions
A good university is especially talented at fomenting dia-
logue because it trains its community (students and profes-
sors) in two of the most philosophical virtues, namely love 
and humility. I will conclude this paper by discussing the role 
of the latter in bioethics training.
Dialogue requires acceptance of the fact that, no matter 
how long one has studied, one can be wrong. This attitude 
results in a growing ability to listen to the other and the au-
dacity to enter lands that bring the consolidated professional 
back to the position of student. The primary obstacle to this 
challenge is pride, which, as Sellés argues based on texts by 
Thomas Aquinas, is counted among the main vices in the 
university setting (2008). The second obstacle is the arro-
gance that is often attributed to doctors, which must be well 
understood to counteract it. This arrogance does not usu-
ally involve internal attitudes, but rather the inevitable divin-
izing gaze of patients who daily entrust doctors with their 
vulnerability and confidence. Without proper precautions in 
the patient-physician relationship, over time it is increasingly 
difficult to reject such a false image. This temptation is even 
stronger for those who treat the soul, as well as for philoso-
phers who, by tradition, place this virtue at the heart of their 
profession. Part of the blame lies with the false belief  that 
humility and wisdom require nothing more than a college de-
gree. This tends to be forgotten due to professionals’ natural 
tendency to try to maintain the most characteristic image of 
their profession. However, not listening and not learning is 
better than pretending to be listening and learning.
Here we find the two main obstacles in doctor’s inter-
disciplinary (bioethical) training, which hinder, on the one 
hand, prudential training of doctors and, on the other 
hand, their contribution to contemporary worldviews. The 
two main theses described herein are also remedies against 
them. In short, the first recommends returning to the heart 
of medicine that is, to rehabilitating its subjective dimension 
and learning to properly embed it in physicians’ knowledge 
and practice. In other words, it involves giving back profes-
sionals their capacity for awe, i.e., for understanding their 
art. There is no greater guide for avoiding missteps, and no 
more favorable wind for avoiding professional drift towards 
partisan interests. 
The second thesis involves achieving this goal with three 
consecutive training stages. The first must be practical be-
cause the first habit of the heart, the virtue of sensory con-
templation, is only possible in clinical experience. Those 
dedicated to professionalism are ideal candidates for leading 
these first steps. In an intermediate stage, doctors are taught 
to avoid naive approaches by studying ethics from the inter-
nal logic of medicine, a task assigned to scholars of the histo-
ry of professional thought. Here, medical ethics is involved. 
This professional training then culminates in the acquisition 
of the second habit of the heart, intellectual contemplation, 
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with which doctors are able to decide what is truly best for 
each patient, to assume responsibilities as citizens and, last 
but not least, to make medicine their passion (Echarte, Gri-
jalba, 2017). Bioethicists would be the best choice for intro-
ducing professionals to this third phase of training, which is 
typically university-based.
The first part of this article described an intellectual cli-
mate that is not entirely conducive to implementing such a 
training project. Are there reasons for hope or is Western 
culture facing its decline? The answer depends, first of all, 
on a few citizens, on individuals who, as Ortega y Gasset de-
scribes them, are aware that they need “neither protection, 
attention nor sympathy from the masses. [They] maintain 
[their] character of complete inutility, and thereby free [them-
selves] from all subservience to the average man… and joy-
ously accept [their] free destiny as bird[s] of the air [a bird of 
the Good God, in the Spanish original text], without asking 
anybody to take [them] into account, without recommend-
ing or defending [themselves]” (Ortega y Gasset 1951, p. 93). 
The work and sacrifice of a few would be more than enough 
to chase away the current shadows that threaten everything, 
including medical sensitivity.
Second, the new generation’s power should not be under-
estimated. Young people start from scratch and, therefore, 
are still capable of capturing the ideals that emanate from 
reality, even if  they are found at the most sensitive (lowest) 
level. For that very reason, today more than ever, teachers 
must pay attention and learn in their classrooms.
I finish with a reflection on a certain advantage that the 
medical profession has in terms of avoiding intellectual vul-
garity in comparison with fields dedicated to pure speculation. 
The beliefs of those who practice the former, however firm 
they may be, are subjected to unrelenting reality every day. Suf-
fering and death are extraordinary reminders of human falli-
bility and the transformative power of compassion. It is more 
difficult for physicians (a word whose Greek root is physis) to 
become empty fortresses full of blatantly false ideas. Indeed, 
humanist doctors are nothing other than well-trained doctors 
who have learned to overcome despotic and faint-hearted at-
titudes. They constitute excellent both gray and green travel 
companions in the journey of knowledge and life.
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